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ROCKY RIVER v. SERB:
SECOND-GUESSING THE STATE LEGISLATURE
INTRODUCTION
In Rocky River u State Employment Relations Board,' a divided Ohio
Supreme Court held that the binding arbitration provision in Ohio's Public
Employees' Collective Bargaining Act of 19832 (Act) violated the state
constitution? The state legislature, per the Act, required binding arbitra-
tion when an impasse developed in contract negotiations between a city
and its safety forces. The Act granted most of Ohio's public employees
the right to strike, but withheld that right from members of police forces
and firefighting units in exchange for binding arbitration of their bargain-
ing disputes
A bare majority of the court, however, found binding arbitration
violated a charter-city's home-rule powers and constituted an unlawful
delegation of municipal legislative authority to an outside arbitrator?
Because the majority revised its opinion three times,' the court spent
eight months writing its 4-3 ruling? Just three months later, after a new
justice took office,10 the court took the unusual step of reopening the cas. 1
While technically a reconsideration, the court is not going to hear fur-
ther oral arguments or accept any more briefs from the parties.'2 Novem-
ber's narrow 4-3 decision most likely will be replaced by another 4-3
decision finding the procedure constitutional
3
1 39 Ohio St. 3d 196, 530 N.E.2d 1 (1988).
'Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.23 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
3 Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
4 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(DX1) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
5 Id. § 4117.14(DX2) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
6 Id. §§ 4117.14(DX1), 4117.15(A) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
7 Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 201, 203, 205, 530 N.E.2d at 5, 8, 9.
8 Id. at 219 n.12, 530 N.E.2d at 21 n.12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 196, 530 N.E.2d at 1.
xo Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 11, 1989, at 1-A, col. 1, 10-A, cols. 3-4. Alice Robie Resnick of
Toledo replaced retiring Justice Ralph Locher as a result of her victory in the November 1988 elections.
" Rocky River v. SERB, 41 Ohio St. 3d 602, 535 N.E.2d 657 (1989) (granting motion for recon-
sideration of denial of motion for rehearing).
" Id. For further discussion of the procedural issues involved in the Ohio Supreme Court's recon-
sideration of their November 1988 decision also see Rocky River v. SERB, 40 Ohio St. 3d 606, 533
N.E.2d 270 (1988) (4-3) (denial of motion for rehearing); Rocky River v. SERB, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3-4,
539 N.E.2d 103, 105-06 (1989) (reversing November 1988 decision and upholding constitutionality
of binding arbitration); id. at 21-22, 539 N.E.2d at 120-21 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1" Rocky River, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 1-2, 20, 539 N.E.2d at 104, 119-20. See Postscript.
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Such a ruling would undoubtedly be a victory for labor and for the
powers of the state legislature over municipal powers. But the city of Rocky
River will not be the only loser. This rapid turnabout on the state's highest
court can only mean a loss of prestige to the judiciary and the apparent
compromise of their judicial integrity.
This note discusses why Rocky River was wrongly decided as a mat-
ter of constitutional adjudication and why it is likely to be overruled, ir-
respective of a personnel change on the court. The note concludes that
the decision, written by Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, was weak and bas-
ed on questionable policy. The majority misapplied recent precedent on
local government's home-rule powers, ignored another provision of the
state constitution granting the state legislature unlimited authority in
the field of public employee welfare, and ignored the stare decisis effect
of its recent decisions which found the Act was a general law of statewide
concern. Instead of presuming the Act's constitutionality,4 the majority
second-guessed the wisdom of the legislature. The justices also struck
down a crucial section of the Act because it did not fit their subjective
notions of democracy and public accountability.
BACKGROUND
Ohio became the fortieth state to recognize public sector collective
bargaining when the state adopted the Act in 1983!5 Democrats in the
state legislature introduced and passed the legislation in a little over
three months.! 6 The newly-elected Democratic Governor, Richard Celeste,
signed the bill (S.B. 133) on July 6, 1983.!7 The state legislature actually
began drafting similar legislation in the 1970s.' s However, Republican
Governor James Rhodes vetoed bills on the subject in 197519 and 1978! 0
The state legislature repealed the Ferguson Act 2' when it adopted S.B.
133!2 The Ferguson Act legally prevented Ohio public employees from
1, State v. Dorso, 4 Ohio St. 3d 60, 61, 446 N.E.2d 449, 450 (1983);
"In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:
(A) Compliance with the constitutions of the state and of the United States is intended."
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.47 (Anderson 1984).
15 Comment, Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Ohio: Before and After Senate Bill Na 133,
17 AKRON L. REV. 229, 229 (1983).
" O'Reilly, Gath, Structures and Conflicts: Ohio's Collective Bargaining Law for Public Employees,
44 Omo ST. L.J. 891, 894 (1983).
17 Id. at 895.
1" Id. at 893.
19 Id. at 894.
20 Comment, supra note 15, at 229.
'1 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.05 (Anderson 1980).
Omo LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF ENACTMENTS: January, 1983-August, 1983,
115th General Assembly, at 174 (1983).
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striking between 1947 and 1984.P The government employer could fine
or fire striking employees2 and prevent them from receiving a raise during
the following year2 5 The Ferguson Act required the employer to notify
the employee that the work stoppage was considered a strike before the
employer took any disciplinary actions permitted by the Act. 6 While this
provided the employer with some discretion, public employers rarely, if
ever, invoked the Ferguson Act in the years immediately preceding its
repeal?7
Though the Ferguson Act legally prohibited strikes, it did not pre-
vent them. Various sources estimated public employees in Ohio engaged
in more than 400 strikes in the decade prior to repeal of the Ferguson
Act?8 Since that repeal, there has reportedly been only one illegal job
action undertaken by police officers in Ohio?9
The Act explicitly grants Ohio's public employees the right to strike?
The Act covers state employees and employees of political subdivisions,
such as cities, townships and counties?' Employees can strike only after
submitting to the Act's clearly delineated impasse resolution procedures,
such as mediation and fact-finding? 2 The Act sets out a comprehensive
scheme to regulate all public sector collective bargaining. It imposes fixed
time schedules for each stage of the impasse,33 authorizes injunctive relief
for the employer, and prohibits certain conduct?4 The Act also established
a State Employment Relations Board (SERB) to administer the Act, to
assist in resolving negotiation impasses and to conduct certain studies?5
Safety forces (e.g., fire and police officers) are among a select group
of public employees to whom the legislature did not grant a right to
strike?' Their duties involve the community's health, safety and welfare.
2 Id.; O'Reilly, supra note 16, at 892-93.
14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05 (Anderson 1980).
23 Id. § 4117.03 (Anderson 1980).
2 Id. § 4117.04 (Anderson 1980).
27 Comment, supra note 15, at 235.
28 State, ex reL Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. SERB, 22 Ohio St. 3d 1, 5, 488
N.E.2d 181, 185 (1986) (there were 428 public work stoppages in Ohio from 1973-1980); O'Reilly,
supra note 16, at 894 n.37 (Sen. Eugene Branstool, sponsor of S.B. 133, said in press release there
were 434 public strikes in Ohio from 1971-1981); Brief for Appellee AFSCME Ohio Council 8 at
A-26, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157) (U.S. Dept. of Labor ranked Ohio
third among the states with 458 public employee strikes for the time period 1972-1980).
"Brief for Defendant-Appellee SERB at 7, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No.
87-157).
'0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(DX2) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
31 I& § 4117.01(C) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
11 Id. § 4117.14 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
33 Id.
Id. §H 4117.15, 4117.16, 4117.18(C), 4117.23 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
3' Id § 4117.02 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
Id § 4117.14(DX1) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
Fall, 1989]
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An impasse in those bargaining sessions is resolved through final offer
settlement proceedings. 7Such proceedings are not used until a current
collective bargaining agreement has lapsed or a week has passed since
SERB published the fact-finder's recommendations?8 The latter only oc-
curs if one of the parties expressly rejects the fact-finder's recommenda-
tions?9 Unless three-fifths of the union's total membership or three-fifths
of the public employer's legislative body reject the fact-finding report, it
is considered accepted4 If either party rejects the fact-finder's report, the
parties and SERB select a "conciliator "'41 The "conciliator" is essential-
ly an arbitrator 2 The arbitrator must pick and choose between the par-
ties' final offers on an issue-by-issue basis.'3 The parties submit written
offers and the arbitrator holds a hearing" Section 4117.14(I) of the Act
requires both parties to treat the arbitrator's decision as a "binding man-
date" and to implement that decision.'5 Section 4117.14(1) was the focus
of the constitutional challenge in Rocky Rive.I s6
FACTS
The city of Rocky River recognized Local 695 of the International
Association of Firefighters as the exclusive bargaining agent for the city's
firefighters after the Act took effect in April 1984P4 Both the city and
the union attempted to negotiate a contract during the remainder of the
year.8 They were unable to resolve a number of issues and utilized the
Act's mediation and fact-finding procedures. 9 After mediation, the par-
ties disagreed on seven issues 0 The fact-finder, after a two-day hearing,
recommended the union's wage offer and agreed with the city on the other
37 ld. §§ 4117.14(DX1), 4117.14(G) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
33 Id § 4117.14(D) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
Id § 4117.14(CX6) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
40 Id.
41 Id § 4117.14(DX1) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
42 Id § 4117.02(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988) ("The board (SERB) shall appoint... arbitrators.').
This Note will use the terms "conciliator" and "arbitrator" interchangeably.
43 Id § 4117.14(GX7) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
" Id § 4117.14(GX3) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
4 "Id § 4117.14(I) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
" "The issuance of a final offer settlement award constitutes a binding mandate to the public
employer and the exclusive representative to take whatever actions are necessary to implement
the award." Id.
47 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 196, 530 N.E.2d at 2. Rocky River is a Cleveland suburb
in western Cuyahoga County.
48 Id.
'9 Brief for Defendant-Appellee State Employment Relations Board at 7, Rocky River v. SERB,
39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157).
50 Rocky River v. SERB, No. 51299, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Dec 1, 1986), rev'd,
39 Ohio St. 3d 196, 530 N.E.2d 1 (1988) [hereinafter Rocky River (Ct. App.)]. The city and union
disagreed on salary, hours, seniority raises, sick leave, laid off employees' insurance, employer's in-
surance contributions, and outside fire protection contracts. Id.
(VOL. 23:2AKmON LAW I VE W
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outstanding issues.3' The union accepted the fact-finder's report, but Rocky
River's city council rejected it on December 11, 1984.' The city's rejec-
tion led to binding arbitration. Rocky River agreed to proceed with the
process, but notified SERB and the union it would not be bound by the
arbitrator's decision. The city maintained that binding arbitration was
unconstitutional 5
3
The arbitrator decided in favor of the union after a hearing. 4 He ac-
cepted the union's last best offer in a 22-page conciliation award.5P The
difference in wage proposals was approximately $27,000 per year or $500
per firefighter.6
Rocky River filed suit to test the constitutionality of the Act's bind-
ing arbitration process prior to the arbitrator's decision.5 7 Rocky River
filed a declaratory judgment action in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court on February 6, 1985, naming the union and SERB as defendants.8
The arbitrator released his decision on February 21, 1985.?"
The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment and denied the city's cross-motion for summary judgment.3 0 The
trial court held that binding arbitration between a municipality and its
safety forces prevailed over provisions of a city charter and was not an
unlawful delegation of legislative power!1
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County affirmed3 2 Judge Richard
Markus, writing for himself and two other justices, held section 4117.14(I)
5' Brief for Defendant-Appellee SERB at 7, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No.
87-157).
52 Rocky River (Ct. App.), supra note 50, at 2.
" Brief for Appellant at 6, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157).
"Brief for Defendant-Appellee SERB at 8, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No.
87-157).
11 Brief for Appellee AFSCME Ohio Council 8 at A-1-A-23, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St.
3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157).
"Brief for Appellee Rocky River Firefighters Association, Local 695 at 6, Rocky River v. SERB,
39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157). The city's budget for employee salaries was approximately
$7 million. Id. The difference between the city's and union's wage proposals represented less than
one-half of one percent of Rocky River's projected annual expenditures. Brief for Defendant-Appellee
SERB at 8, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157).
" Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 196-97, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
" Id. at 197, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
" Id. at 196, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
" Id. at 197, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
61 Id.
62 Rocky River (Ct. App.), supra note 50.
Fall, 1989]
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of the Act did not violate Rocky River's home rule powers1 3 The court
said the Act was "a statewide response to statewide problems surround-
ing labor disputes with public employers." 4 The court followed the
"statewide concern" doctrine of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Ket-
tering u SERB, which upheld another provision of the Act as not violating
a city's home rule powers. 6e The court also noted that resolving municipal
labor disputes does lead to wage-setting, but setting wages was merely
a "secondary consequence" of the binding arbitration provisions.1 7 The
court also ruled binding arbitration of selected disputes was not an un-
constitutional delegation of municipal legislative authority to a private
individual. s The court relied on its previous decision in Cleveland Police
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Clevelands9 where it upheld arbitration of police
salaries that was required under the terms of a contract.0 Rocky River
appealed this decision to the state supreme court 1
ANALYSIS
The Court's Use of Home Rule Doctrine was Irrelevant
The legislature enacted the Act, including its binding arbitration pro-
cedure for resolving negotiation impasses between cities and their safe-
ty forces, as an exercise of its police power. The primary objective was
to promote the general safety and welfare of all the state's citizens!2
Rocky River relied on sections 3 and 7 of article XVIII of the Ohio
Constitution to invalidate binding arbitration required under section
4117.14(I) of the Act. Section 3 states:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not
in conflict with general laws 3
63 Rocky River (Ct. App.), supra note 50, at 12. See discussion of home rule in following section
of this note, especially nn.74 & 101, and Rocky River v. SERB, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 22-23 n.18, 38-42
& n.51, 539 N.E.2d at 122 n.18, 133-37 & n.51 (Wright, J., dissenting).
64 Id.
6 26 Ohio St. 3d 50, 496 N.E.2d 983 (1986).
Id. at 51, 496 N.E.2d at 985.
67 Rocky River (Ct. App.), supra note 50, at 10.
66 Id. at 9-10.
60 24 Ohio App. 3d 16, 492 N.E.2d 861 (1985).
70 Rocky River (Ct. App.), supra note 50, at 9-10.
71 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 530 N.E.2d at 2.
Kettering v. SERB, 26 Ohio St. 3d 50, 55, 496 N.E.2d 983, 987-88 (1986).
' OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. Section 7 states:
Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and
may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers
of local self-government.
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7.
[VOL. 23:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Commentators predicted the binding arbitration provision would trig-
ger a constitutional attack based on the home rule argument74 Rocky
River's charter specifically granted the city council power to set salaries
for all city employees75
The Ohio Supreme Court has long held a municipality's setting of
wages is a right of local self-government and not an exercise of police
power?6 This distinction was critical to Rocky River77 In State ex rel.
Canada v. Phillipe8 the court held that the phrase "as are not in conflict
with general laws" modifies a municipality's police powers, but not its
powers of local self-government 9 However, the Canada court noted in
dictum that it was "conceivable" the state's exercise of its police power
''may properly affect the exercise of powers of local self-government by
a municipality.' 80
The court has never construed article XVIII, section 3 as granting
municipalities unlimited power of local self-government sl The court's test
for deciding whether the subject matter in a dispute between a city and
the state involves the city's power of local self-government is based on
the "extraterritorial effects" of the city's action s2
In Village of Beachwood v. Board of Electionse3 the court held that
state law prevailed over provisions of a city charter.4 Beachwood officials
" White, Kaplan, Hawkins, Ohio's Public Employee Bargaining Law: Can It Withstand Constitu-
tional Challenge?, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1984). The authors explain that Ohio cities, whether
or not they have enacted a city charter, have home rule powers under article XVIII, section 3. Home
rule powers encompass the authority to enact legislation on "local self-government" questions. Local
legislation must bow to state law only if the local law involves police power regulations in conflict
with state law. The effect of article XVIII, section 7 is procedural. A non-chartered city must follow
state laws regarding proper procedures for enacting substantive ordinances. Id. at 34-36.
" The Council shall have the power to fix the salaries of its members and of all other
officers and employees of the City, whether elected, appointed or chosen, and to establish
such bonds as in the opinion of the Council are necessary for the faithful discharge
of the duties. The premium of any bond required by the Council shall be paid by the
City. The salary of an elected officer shall not be increased during his term of office
nor decreased during such term except with the consent of the officer involved. If the
office is elective the salary shall be set at least forty-five (45) days prior to the last
date for filing of nominating petitions. The Council may authorize the payment to any
officer or employee for travel for any municipal purpose.
ROCKY RIVER, OHIO, CHARTER art. III, § 11.
76 White, supra note 74, at 38.
7 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 200, 530 N.E.2d at 5.
78 168 Ohio St. 191 (1958).
"9 Id. at 197.
80 Id. at 200.
81 Weir v. Rimmelin, 15 Ohio St. 3d 55, 56, 472 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1984).
82 Village of Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958); Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
"' Beachwood, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
" Id. at 372, 148 N.E.2d at 923.
Fall, 19891
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attempted to prevent a state-required election on the detachment of a
portion of the village to form a new township. The court noted that the
constitutional grant of local self-government may only involve the inter-
nal affairs of the municipality:
If the result affects only the municipality itself, with no extra-
territorial effects, the subject is clearly within the power of local
self-government and is a matter for the determination of the
municipality. However, if the result is not so confined it becomes
a matter for the General Assembly.5
In Cleveland Elec Illuminating Ca v. Painesville,86 the court clarified
the test: "[I]f the regulation of the subject matter affects the general public
of the state as a whole more than it does the local inhabitants the mat-
ter passes from what was a matter for local government to a matter of
general state interest."8
7
The majority in Rocky River said firefighters' salaries only affected
residents in Rocky River. 8 The majority took a narrow view of statewide
concern and measured direct effects. 9 The court did not discuss the ef-
fect that safety force salaries in one community can have on other near-
by communities even though the arbitrator's decision involved such com-
parisons 0 The court also ignored the possible effects a police or fire strike
might have on the resources of surrounding communities. The court also
failed to mention the possible salutary effect an arbitration award may
have on parties in other political subdivisions to reach settlements in
their negotiations?1
Furthermore, two court decisions decided only two years before Rocky
River took a much broader view of extraterritorial effects. In State, ex.
rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge Na 44 v. SERB,92 the court's
syllabus found that the Act was a general law? 3 The court also noted that
the Act was a law of statewide concern?
4
"' Id. at 371, 148 N.E.2d at 923.
8 15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
87 Id. at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78.
88 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 200, 530 N.E.2d at 5.
I /d.
Brief for Appellee AFSCME Ohio Council 8 at A-1-A-23, Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St.
3d 196 (1988) (No. 87-157).
1 Anderson, The Ohio Bargaining Impasse Procedures: An Outsider's View, 35 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 374, 379 (1985).
92 22 Ohio St. 3d 1, 488 N.E.2d 181 (1986).
93 Id. at 1, 488 N.E.2d at 182.
94 Id. at 4-5, 488 N.E.2d at 184-85.
[VOL. 23:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Later that year in Kettering,9 5 a 4-3 majority found that another pro-
vision of the Act was constitutional and did not violate a city's right to
exercise its powers of local self-government?6 Then Chief Justice Frank
Celebrezze, writing for the majority, noted the Act explicitly preserved
a city's local self-government management powers? 7 Celebrezze noted that
a state's exercise of its police powers in matters of statewide concern may
supersede municipal powers?8 He found Kettering's ordinance, which ex-
cluded all supervisory employees from bargaining units, conflicted with
the Act's definition of public employees?9 Celebrezze relied on Dayton to
find the legislature was exercising its police power to promote the general
safety and welfare of public employees when it passed the Act, 0 thus
the doctrine of statewide concern applied. 1
On the same day the court decided Rocky River, it unanimously decid-
ed, in Twinsburg v. SERB, °s that the Act did not violate a charter-city's
home rule powers.0 3 Twinsburg sought a declaratory judgment
establishing that it was not required to bargain with the union seeking
to represent its police force.'0 4 The opinion for the court said there was
no "irreconcilable conflict" between the Act and a city's right to deter-
mine employee wages. 05 The court made a distinction between the city's
right to determine employee compensation and "the method or process"
of determining that compensation. 06 The court said the Act, minus the
binding arbitration provision struck down in Rocky River, deals with the
latter, but does not interfere with the former.'°7
9* Kettering v. SERB, 26 Ohio St. 3d 50, 496 N.E.2d 983 (1986).
"Id. at 56, 496 N.E.2d at 988.
" Id. at 53, 496 N.E.2d at 986; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
"Kettering, 26 Ohio St. 3d at 53, 496 N.E.2d at 986.
Id. at 51, 496 N.E.2d at 985.
100 Id. at 55, 496 N.E.2d at 987-88.
101 Id. J. Locher's dissent emphasized that state laws traditionally have prevailed over local laws
only when the local law was characterized as a police, sanitary, or other regulation and not when
the local subdivision was exercising powers of self-government. Id. at 60-63, 496 N.E.2d at 991-94
(Locher, J., dissenting).
102 39 Ohio St. 3d 226, 530 N.E.2d 26 (1988).
10 Id. at 228-29, 530 N.E.2d at 29.
14 Id. at 226, 530 N.E.2d at 27.
10' Id. at 228, 530 N.E.2d at 29.
100 Id. Two of the concurring opinions faulted the principal opinion for limiting the decision to
presuming the Act's constitutionality and ignoring the statewide concern doctrine and the state
legislature's power to provide for the general welfare of public employees under article II, section
34. Id. at 230-35, 530 N.E.2d at 30-34 (Sweeney, J., Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
107 Id. at 228, 530 N.E.2d at 29. In the court's May 1989 decision, "inconsistent" language in
Twinsburg regarding binding arbitration was specifically overruled. Rocky River, 43 Ohio St. 3d
at 20, 539 N.E.2d at 120.
Fall, 1989]
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Rocky River applied a mechanical home-rule test to void the binding
arbitration provision. The majority reiterated that setting wages was a
power of local self-government and found Rocky River's contract impasse
had no extraterritorial effects.0 8 The court misapplied recent home rule
precedent. The court also ignored recent decisions upholding the Act as
a state law of general nature that should prevail over city charters or
ordinances.0 9
If allowed to stand, the Rocky River opinion could cause great confu-
sion in the relationship between local governments and the state. The
legislature may be limited in "solving" sensitive and controversial issues
of public importance if any municipality can easily resort to invoking
home rule to thwart progressive legislation.
Rocky River Ignored the Explicit Language of Article II, Section 34
Ohio Constitution, article II, section 34," states:
Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor,
establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort,
health, safety and general welfare of all employees; and no other
provision of the Constitution shall impair or limit this power."0
The majority said this section had limited effect 1 The court found
that the 1912 state constitutional convention adopted the provision so
the state could legally set minimum wages and the hours of its
employeesW 2 Furthermore, the majority stated that no one had ever argued
the provision could supersede a city's power to set employee wages."3 Chief
Justice Moyer felt such a holding would "overrule years of well-established
law in Ohio" and "strip all incorporated municipalities in Ohio of one
of their most important responsibilities'"""
The majority and dissent disagreed about distinguishing a 1967 case
that relied on article II, section 34. In State, ex rel. Board of Trustees of
Pension Fund v. Board of Trustees of Relief Fund, 5 a unanimous court
101 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 200, 530 N.E.2d at 5.
109 State, ex reL Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. SERB, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 8,
488 N.E.2d at 187; Kettering v. SERB, 26 Ohio St. 3d at 54 n.4, 496 N.E.2d at 987 n.4.
"o OMo CONST. art. II, § 34.
"' Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 205, 530 N.E.2d at 9.
112 Id.
11 Id. at 205-06, 530 N.E.2d at 9-10.
... Id. at 207, 530 N.E.2d at 11.
115 12 Ohio St. 2d 105, 233 N.E.2d 135 (1967).
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held a non-chartered city had to transfer assets of its police pension fund
to a state fund!" The local board said the transfer violated the city's home
rule powers.117 The court said the ratifiers of the 1912 provision intended
the section to apply to local governments and state employees!"8 The court
recognized that the state's political subdivisions "en masse" were one of
the largest employers in the state.' 9 The court also held local police and
firefighters were employees "within the scope of this provision.' 120
Rocky River attempted to distinguish Pension Fund in a curious man-
ner. In Pension Fund the court stated article II, section 34 applied because
of a statewide concern.21 The majority found the state legislature bailed
out local pension funds to reform an existing program.2 2 Justice Douglas'
dissent in Rocky River noted that Pension Fund's invocation of article
II, section 34 did not involve the narrow scope of minimum wages or the
hours of labor, but a pension fund.23 Justice Douglas held that if article
II, section 34 only applied to minimum wages, then about half of the
language would be "mere surplusage"' 4 Douglas also felt the result in
Pension Fund intruded more on powers of local self-government than the
challenged arbitrator's award in Rocky Rive. 25 In Pension Fund, the state
required the cities transferring assets to the state fund to pay for 55 years
an amount a state board would determine.!2 6 Since the Act involves the
general welfare of employees, Douglas argued the home rule argument
did not apply to challenging binding arbitration 2 7
Justices Sweeney and Brown also agreed that article II, section 34
authorized binding arbitration. 2s Both Douglas129 and Sweeney'30 asserted
that article II, section 34 was another ground for upholding the Act's con-
stitutionality in Twinsburg's home rule challenge!"' Justice Locher,32
116 Id. at 107, 233 N.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 106, 233 N.E.2d at 137. The local board also argued the state statute in question violated
article XII, section 2; article II, section 28; and article II, section 4 of the Ohio Constitution. The
court said article II, section 34 was "dispositive" of all issues. Id.
... Id. at 107, 233 N.E.2d at 137.
I's Id.
120 Id.
121 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 207, 530 N.E.2d at 11.
122 Id. at 206-07, 530 N.E.2d at 10-11.
123 Id. at 216, 530 N.E.2d at 18 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 217, 530 N.E.2d at 19.
"2 Id. at 219, 530 N.E.2d at 20-21.
126 Id. at 218, 530 N.E.2d at 20.
7 ld. at 215-16, 530 N.E.2d at 18.
126 Id. at 208, 225, 530 N.E.2d at 12, 26 (Sweeney, J., Brown, J., dissenting).
129 Twinsburg v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 234-35, 530 N.E.2d at 34 (Douglas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
..o Id. at 233, 530 N.E.2d at 32-33 (Sweeney, J., concurring and dissenting).
131 Id. at 226, 530 N.E.2d at 26.
132 Id. at 227-29, 530 N.E.2d at 28-29.
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who wrote the majority opinion in Twinsburg, and Justice Wright, 33 who
wrote a concurring opinion, did not cite article II, section 34. Locher and
Wright comprised half of the majority for Rocky River.34
One can only speculate why several justices take exception to the clear
and unambiguous language of article II, section 34. One possible reason
may be a desire to limit some controversial pro-labor decisions the court
rendered prior to Chief Justice Moyer's election to the court. 35 Whatever
the justices' concern, Chief Justice Moyer's majority opinion does not ade-
quately explain why article II, section 34 does not cover the Act's com-
prehensive statutory scheme for preventing safety forces from striking.
The Rationale for Rocky River was a Policy Preference for Public
Accountability in Local Government
The majority held that the conciliator's binding arbitration of collec-
tive bargaining disputes in the field of city safety employee wages and
benefits was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.36 Case
law, rather than any specific provision of the state constitution, governs
the delegation doctrine in Ohio. In Blue Cross v. Ratchford,'37 the court
defined the essentials of valid delegation-policy standards, and a procedure
for effective review.38 The Ratchford court backed away from the modern
trend of focusing on "safeguards" rather than requiring specific "stan-
dards.' 3 9
13 Id. at 229-30, 530 N.E.2d at 29-30 (Wright, J., concurring).
"4 Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 208, 530 N.E.2d at 12.
15 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982) (employee not barred by article H, section 35 of Ohio Constitution or the worker's
compensation act from suing employer for intentional torts); State, ex rel. Ramirez v. Industrial Com-
mission, 69 Ohio St. 2d 630, 433 N.E.2d 586 (1982) (temporary total disability defined as preven-
ting worker from returning to his or her former position of employment); Littlefield v. Pillsbury
Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 453 N.E.2d 570 (1983) (court adopts special hazard rule allowing worker's
compensation awards for injuries occurring off work premises, before or after work, if injury occurs
because of hazard created by the employment). See Justice Wright's dissent in the subsequent reversal
of Rocky River in which he argued for a limited view of article II, section 34 based on the Framers'
intent that minimum wage and maximum hours legislation might pass constitutional muster at
a time when federal and state courts were striking down such legislation on substantive due pro-
cess grounds. Rocky River, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 26-33, 539 N.E.2d at 124-30 (Wright, J., dissenting).
I" Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 205, 530 N.E.2d at 9.
137 64 Ohio St. 2d 256, 416 N.E.2d 614 (1980).
138 Id. at 256, 416 N.E.2d at 615.
A statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes, through
legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an intelligible principle to which
the administrative officer or body must conform and further establishes a procedure
whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effectively.. Id.
Id. at 260, 416 N.E.2d at 618; White, supra note 74, at 13.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/10
SECOND-GUESSING THE STATE LEGISLATURE
The purpose or policy of the Act is found in section 4117.22: "promoting
orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employees" ' 4 0 The chairman of the New York City Office of Collec-
tive Bargaining stated that one of the major purposes of Ohio's Act "is
to resolve impasses and avoid strikes"' The legislature could reasonably
have considered the rights of striking or going to arbitration as
"stimuli' ' 4 2 or "ultimate sanctions' ' 4 3 for realistic collective bargaining.
Rocky River found the Act's standards for an arbitrator still allowed
the arbitrator "considerable discretion"" 4 The Act provides that the ar-
bitrator shall consider such matters as past contracts between the par-
ties, the public interest and welfare, and the ability of the public employer
to finance and administer the proposed contract. 45 The principal dissent
maintained these were "detailed guidelines."'"
The majority also found the Act only permitted limited judicial review
of the arbitrator's decision.47 The Act allows local courts of common pleas
to review arbitrator awards under the state's arbitration statute!.4 8 The
majority noted that case law under that statute only permits limited
judicial review of private arbitrations.!4
The Act clearly sets forth a policy, standards and judicial review. The
lack of public accountability is the root of the court's concern. Instead
of focusing on binding arbitration as a mechanism for resolving labor
disputes, the majority focused on such procedural facts as a city council
must enact ordinances to fix salaries, set budgets and fund appropria-
tions.!50 An arbitrator's "binding mandate" interfered with these legis-
lative functions' 3 The majority cited approving language from those few
jurisdictions which have invalidated arbitration in public sector collective
bargaining because of improper delegation of legislative authority.52
1' OHoO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
141 Anderson, supra note 91, at 377.
142 Id. at 382.
1
. Bumpass, Ashmus, Public Sector Bargaining in a Democracy-An Assessment of the Ohio Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Law, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593, 640 (1984-85).
1U Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 204, 530 N.E.2d at 8.
145 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(GX7) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
14 Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 215, 530 N.E.2d at 17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 204, 530 N.E.2d at 8.
14 Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(H) (Anderson Supp. 1988), referring to review as governed
by Oino REV. CODE ANN. Chapter 2711.
149 Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 204, 530 N.E.2d at 8.
150 Id. at 201, 530 N.E.2d at 6.
151 Id.
151 Id. at 201-03, 530 N.E.2d at 6-7.
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However, most state supreme courts that have considered the constitu-
tionality of binding arbitration for public employees have upheld the
statutes. s5
The Rocky River court apparently sided with those commentators who
maintain that setting wages is a political decision and a power of local
self-government. T4 That analysis ignores the fact that a city council still
sets wages, adopts a budget and appropriates monies. An arbitrator can-
not perform these functions. The arbitrator merely carries out the provi-
sions of the Act. True, an arbitrator's decisions can affect the budget.
However, the city is still free to make policy choices in the city budget
in accordance with a conciliator's award.
55
The Act's "binding mandate" is hardly coercive. Collective bargain-
ing is a series of compromises between both parties. The Act allows the
parties to agree to other forms of impasse resolution,5" instead of follow-
ing the binding arbitration route! 57 Otherwise, binding arbitration is the
last resort under the Act for a limited group of employees who are denied
the right to strike. The arbitrator must consider the city's ability to pay
as one factor in making the award.! s Thus, opponents who claim arbitra-
tion can "bust" city budgets and force tax hikes fail to make a persuasive
argument. 59
Rocky River Ignored the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Rocky River, in effect, usurped the power of the state legislature. The
dissents correctly pointed out that the majority was substituting its view
of the wisdom of the legislation instead of presuming the constitutionality
of the statuteWlso Since the constitutional questions could have been decided
in favor of upholding the binding arbitration provision, the decision seems
to rest on the court's notion of public accountability.
The court also ignored two recent cases, decided only two years prior,
which had stamped the Act as a general law and, consequently, as mani-
' Staudohar, Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration Statutes in Public Employment, 27
LAB. L.J. 670, 675 (1976); White, supra note 74, at 14, 18.
Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 203, 530 N.E.2d at 7-8; White, supra note 74, at 21.
"' Staudohar, supra note 153, at 675.
1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.14(CX1), 4117.14(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
157 IL § 4117.14(DX1) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
"' Id § 4117.14(GX7Xc) (Anderson Supp. 1988).
15 Comment, supra note 15, at 247.
'e Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 208-09, and 210-11, 530 N.E.2d at 12, 14 (Sweeney,
J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).
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festing the legislature's exercise of its police powers.1 6' Those precedents,
particularly Kettering,2 could have conceivably led the court to presume
the Act's binding arbitration mandate prevailed over a city's charter.
Unexplainably, the court also ignored a unanimous decision released the
same day which upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the face of
another home-rule challenge.
6 3
The court was indifferent to the clear language of article II, section
34 which provides a foundation for presuming the constitutionality of
the Act and its binding arbitration provision. Binding arbitration of any
political subdivision's bargaining impasses with safety forces was a state
decision to improve the general welfare of public employees. The court
made an unpersuasive effort to sidestep the Pension Fund'6 4 case, arguably
the strongest precedent in favor of applying article II, section 34 to state
statutes covering the general welfare of public employees.
The majority never directly mentioned the Ratchford test in discuss-
ing the delegation of legislative authority.6 5 The court did address the
issues of standards and judicial review. 66 While those findings were
arguable, the majority did not even mention the legislature's policy in
enacting the provision in discussing their delegation holding.6 7 The court
concluded that state-required final offer settlement arbitration offended
the court's notions of public accountability.
By deciding all three challenged constitutional claims against bind-
ing arbitration, the court ended up with a weak policy decision. From
a policy standpoint, the notion that state-paid private arbitrators lack
the necessary public accountability to issue binding decisions for a
municipality may have been the court's best argument. Lack of public
1I State, ex rel Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. SERB, 22 Ohio St. 3d 1, 488
N.E.2d 181 (1986); Kettering v. SERB, 26 Ohio St. 3d 50, 496 N.E.2d 983 (1986).
'" The vote in Kettering was 4-3, which commanded greater authority. 26 Ohio St. 3d at 56,
496 N.E.2d at 988. In Dayton, three justices concurred only in the syllabus and judgment and three
others concurred separately. 22 Ohio St. 3d at 9, 488 N.E.2d at 187.
Twinsburg v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d 226, 530 N.E.2d 26 (1988).
'"State ex rel Bd. of Trustees of Pension Fund v. Bd. of Trustees of Relief Fund, 12 Ohio St.
2d 105, 233 N.E.2d 135 (1967). The court in its November 1988 decision tried to distinguish Pension
Fund as involving some type of statewide concern that made article II, section 34 uniquely applicable.
Rocky River, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 206-07, 530 N.E.2d at 10-11. But see Justice Wright's dissent in the
court's May 1989 decision where he concedes Pension Fund does support the new majority's posi-
tion, but claims it was wrongly decided and "contains no constitutional history, ignores the ramifica-
tions of its language, and like the majority reaches its conclusion absent rules, facts or rationale."
Rocky River, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 36, 539 N.E.2d at 132 (Wright, J., dissenting).
'" Rocky River v. SERB, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 204, 530 N.E.2d at 8. The majority only mentioned
Ratchford in discussing judicial review of arbitration awards. Id.
1 Id. at 204-05, 530 N.E.2d at 8-9.
Id. at 201-05, 530 N.E.2d at 6-9.
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accountability may be unwise. The state legislature decided otherwise
as part of an effort to fashion a comprehensive scheme. Public account-
ability may have been the rationale behind the court's treatment of the
issues in the case. This notion of local democratic control inherently gives
added support to home rule concepts and avoids a broad interpretation
of article II, section 34 at the expense of local governments. The court
makes plain it focused on public accountability, and not the Ratchford
test, when it decided the question of unlawful delegation of legislative
authority.68 While the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Rocky River may
be laudable from the standpoint of a public accountability policy, it ap-
pears unprincipled as a matter of constitutional adjudication. Precedent,
constitutional provisions and the power of the state legislature were all
ignored or given lesser weight in a balancing contest with local democratic
accountability. Such a holding leaves the court open to a charge that Rocky
River was essentially a political decision.
A court cannot hamper its judicial function through slavish adherence
to precedent. Society's values, the circumstances of ordinary life and no-
tions of right and wrong do change over time. But these concerns are more
appropriate to court decisions on common law questions' 69 It is another
matter to place constitutional adjudication of state statutes on the same
indefinite basis 70
CONCLUSION
Rocky River is likely to be overruled when the Ohio Supreme Court
reconsiders the case. A personnel change on the court almost certainly
led to reopening the case and the views of the other justices are well
known. The merits of the court's November decision, or the lack thereof,
make the case ripe for reversal.
A majority of the justices failed to presume the constitutionality of
a critical provision of the state legislature's comprehensive scheme for
168 Id.
169 See the Ohio Supreme Court's treatment of parental and interspousal tort immunities in the
1980s. The court abolished both in Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985)
(this case overruled three cases decided since 1965).
170 On reconsideration, Justice Douglas, who authored the majority opinion, set out a theory
of stare decisis. Rocky River v. SERB, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 4-10, 539 N.E.2d at 106-11. Douglas argued,
quoting former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, that stare decisis "is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula." Id. at 10, 539 N.E.2d at 111 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.)). Justice Wright, in dissent, welcomed Douglas' "articulate
dissertation" and noted the public would be "well-served" if the court followed Douglas' sugges-
tions. Id. at 22, 539 N.E.2d at 121 (Wright, J., dissenting). See Postscript.
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recognizing and regulating public employee collective bargaining in Ohio.
The court sustained a home rule challenge to section 4117.14(I). A bare
majority held that binding arbitration of a contract impasse between a
home rule charter city and its unionized safety forces interfered with the
power of local self-government to set wages for its employees. The court
held that setting the wages of Rocky River's firefighters did not have any
"extraterritorial effects" beyond the municipal boundaries. The court
misapplied recent developments in home rule doctrine. State law can
prevail over local ordinances when the state's police power is implicated.
There was case authority for the proposition the state legislature passed
the Act as an exercise of its police power to promote the general welfare
of Ohio citizens. The statewide concern doctrine also showed a path
towards upholding binding arbitration.
The majority also found section 4117.14(I) constitutionally infirm
because it constituted an unlawful delegation of municipal legislative
authority to an outside arbitrator. The court's reasoning is suspect. It
never mentioned directly the three-prong Ratchford test - purpose, stand-
ards and adequate judicial review. Instead, the court found the Act's
guidelines for arbitrators allowed them too much discretion and indicated
any judicial review would be limited. The court did not speak to the
legislature's purpose in enacting the Act, but instead focused its atten-
tion on the undesirability of unelected outsiders making political
judgments about policy matters for local governments. The majority rebut-
ted the presumption of section 4117.14(I)'s constitutionality with an ap-
peal to public accountability and democratic principles. Such views are
laudable, but hardly controlling. The Act requires an arbitrator to con-
sider a city's ability to finance wage increases. Arbitration is not coer-
cive, but a final step in a long process in which both city and union
participate.
The glaring weakness of the court's decision is found in its treatment
of article II, section 34. This labor provision of the state constitution in-
cludes clear and apparently unambiguous language that the state can
pass general welfare legislation for employees "and no other provision
of the Constitution shall impair or limit this power." The court said arti-
cle II, section 34 was limited to the ability of the state to set wage and
hour standards for its employees. The court declined to give article II,
section 34 a broader interpretation though there was case precedent for
doing so.
Rocky River appears problematic as an exercise in constitutional ad-
judication. The court ignored the precedential value of recent cases as
they related to the issues in Rocky River. A decision on the very same
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day Rocky River was released upheld another provision of the Act in the
face of another home-rule challenge.
Binding arbitration of labor disputes between a municipality and its
employees is a controversial issue. This note argued the infirmities in
the court's constitutional adjudication of that issue. Requiring binding
arbitration of negotiation impasses between a city and its safety forces
may not be a particularly wise idea, but the state legislature determined
otherwise in place of granting such employees the right to strike. The
court's treatment of the constitutional claims, particularly in its han-
dling of the delegation issue and article II, section 34, and its failure to
defer to legislative policy judgments leaves the court open to the charge
it made an essentially political decision. Section 4117.14(I) passes con-
stitutional muster.
POSTSCRIPT
Six months after the Ohio Supreme Court decided Rocky River 7 1 the
court (with the substitution of one new member) reversed itself. 72 Bind-
ing arbitration of contract disputes between home-rule cities and their
safety forces was held permissible and section 4117.14(I) of the Act, and
the Act itself, were held constitutional.73
Justice Douglas, the author of last year's principal dissent, wrote the
new majority opinion. The decision was grounded on article II, section
34 of the Ohio Constitution.74 Douglas broadly interpreted this labor pro-
vision of the state constitution based on a textual analysis 175 and the
court's broad interpretation of the same provision in the Pension Fund
case. '7 Justice Wright, dissenting, said the new majority misconstrued
the intent of the delegates to the 1912 state constitutional convention! 
77
Delegates adopted the provision in an effort to thwart federal and state
courts which were striking down wage and hour labor legislation on
substantive due process grounds.78 Wright said the court's interpreta-
tion of the phrase "and no other provision of the Constitution shall im-
pair or limit this power"'179 now gives the state legislature unlimited power
to ignore other sections of the state constitution. s0
171 39 Ohio St. 3d 196, 530 N.E.2d 1 (Nov. 2, 1988).
172 Rocky River, 43 Ohio St. 3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 103 (May 10, 1989).
173 Id. at 1-2, 539 N.E.2d at 104.
174 See the second paragraph of the court's syllabus. Id.
175 Id. at 13-16, 539 N.E.2d at 114-16.
170 Id. at 16-18, 539 N.E.2d at 116-18.
177 Id. at 23, 26-34, 539 N.E.2d at 122, 124-30 (Wright, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 26-34, 539 N.E.2d at 124-30 (Wright, J., dissenting).
179 Omo CONsT. art. II, § 34.
180 Rocky River, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 23-26, 539 N.E.2d at 122-24 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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The dissent also noted the court's "inconsistency" in grounding its
decision on article II, section 34 while, at the same time, finding no
unlawful delegation of municipal legislative authority to an outside ar-
bitrator. 81 Wright pointed to 70 years of court precedent on home rule
doctrine 82 and said the court was "effectively reading" home rule out
of the state constitution. 83 The majority held article XVIII, section 3 (the
home rule amendment) was irrelevant to the case!84
The court's about-face is clearly controversial. The court reversed itself
on a major question in the span of six months. Justice Douglas went a
long way to restore some sense of integrity to the court and its decision-
making process.'8 5 He began his opinion with an analytical discussion
of the role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.86 He said courts
should follow precedent in common law matters and statutory interpreta-
tion, but should be "more flexible" when deciding constitutional issues
8 7
The difference in approach depends on the ability of the legislature to
overrule judicial interpretations.88 The need to amend a constitution to
overrule a court decision is much more unlikely and more difficult than
the ability of the legislature to amend statutes or codify common-law doc-
trines.!89
Chief Justice Moyer limited himself to a 59-word dissent!" He adopted
by reference his majority opinion of the previous November and noted
its reversal would affect home rule in Ohio.'9 '
The effects of Rocky River are difficult to discern. While the future
of binding arbitration seems secure, other questions now arise. Is home
rule in Ohio an emasculated concept because of the statewide concern
doctrine' 92 or is home rule only limited to a degree when the state
legislature has specific constitutional authority to enact certain types
of legislation? Will the court continue to broadly interpret article II, sec-
tion 34 in favor of labor or will the court construe the provision more
narrowly when it is pitted against constitutional provisions other than
,' Id. at 37, 539 N.E.2d at 133 (Wright, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 22 n.18, 539 N.E.2d at 122 n.18 (Wright, J., dissenting).
"8 Id. at 42, 539 N.E.2d at 137 (Wright, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 12-13, 539 N.E.2d at 113.
85 See remarks of dissenting Justice Wright accepting Justice Douglas' approach to stare decisis.
Id. at 22, 539 N.E.2d at 121 (Wright, J., dissenting).
'8' Id. at 4-10, 539 N.E.2d at 106-11.
I' id. at 5, 6, 10, 539 N.E.2d at 106-08, 111.
188 Id. at 6, 539 N.E.2d at 107-08.
189 Id.
18" Id. at 20-21, 539 N.E.2d at 120 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
191 Id.
"82 Id. at 42, 539 N.E.2d at 137 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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home rule?193 Will the court recover its prestige or does Justice Douglas'
approach to stare decisis in Rocky River portend constitutional adjudica-
tion in Ohio will resemble judges as crap shooters?
At the very least, judicial deference to the constitutional validity of
legislative enactments in Ohio is settled as a matter of presumption.9
TIMOTHY D. RUDY
11 Id. at 23-26, 43-44, 539 N.E.2d at 122-24, 138 (Wright, J., dissenting).
I" Id. at 10, 539 N.E.2d at 111; id. at 22, 539 N.E.2d at 121 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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